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TIPPING THE SCALES: HOW
GUARDIANSHIP OF BRANDON HAS UPSET
MASSACHUSETTS' BALANCED
SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
In November 1990, twelve-year-old Brandon was a student at the
Judge Rotenberg Educational Center, Inc. ("JRC").' The JRC, located
in Canton, Massachusetts, is a school that provides twenty-four-hour
residential care and aversive therapy for children with behavioral dis-
orders. 2 Brandon was profoundly mentally retarded and diagnosed
with a seizure disorder, tuberous sclerosis, autism and a severe behav-
ioral disorder. 3 His behavior, which included vomiting and ruminating
so extreme that hospitalization was required, had deteriorated to the
point where it was life-threatening.4
In response, the JRC sought to treat Brandon with an electric
shock device known as the Graduated Electronic Decelerator
("GED") . 5 Before it could begin this shock treatment, however, the JRC
needed to secure the approval of the Bristol County Probate Court.°
The court authorized the use of the GED, reasoning that Brandon
would have approved the treatment were he competent to do so. 7 By
employing this reasoning, the court utilized a legal fiction known as
the substituted judgment doctrine.°
1 See Guardianship of Brandon, 677 N.E.2d 114, 118 (Mass. 1997).
2 See, e.g., Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 117; Proposed Behavior Modification Treatment Plan at
3, In re Elly, No. 90P0353-MR (Bristol County Prob. Ct. Jan. 1, 1998) (unpublished treatment
plan, on file with the author) [hereinafter Elly Treatment Plan].
3 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 118.
4 See id. at 118 n.7.
5 See id. at 118. The GED, a device manufactured by the JRC, consists of a transmitter
operated by the staff and a receiver worn by the student. Elly Treatment Plan, supra note 2, at
20. The receiver delivers a surface application of electric current to the student's skin upon
command by the transmitter. See id. The GED device is adjustable with an average intensity of
15.25 milliamperes RMS, a duration range of .2 to 2 seconds, an average peak of 30.5 milliamperes
and a duty cycle of 25%. See id. The GED device also has remote concentric electrodes. See id.
6 See Judge Rotenberg Educ. Cu-. v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Mental Retardation, 677
N.E.2d 127, 132 & n.5 (Mass. 1997) [hereinafter JRC I]. According to a settlement agreement,
the JRC must seek authorization for the use of aversive treatment by means of a substituted
judgment decision. See id. at 132 11.5.
7
 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 118; JRC I, 677 N.E.2d at 132 n.5.; Superintendent of Belcher-
town State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977).
See, e.g., Saikewiex, 370 N.E.2d at 431; Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969); Ex
Parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816).
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The substituted judgment doctrine is rooted in the English com-
mon law, where it was originally crafted over 180 years ago as a means
of granting gifts from the estate of an incompetent person. 9 In more
recent times, however, the doctrine has been borrowed from the realm
of property and applied to the realm of informed consent.'° Courts
currently utilize the substituted judgment doctrine to authorize or
deny medical treatment for individuals deemed incompetent to make
treatment decisions for themselves." In the last twenty years, courts
have applied the doctrine to a broad spectrum of extraordinary medi-
cal care, including sterilization," antipsychotic medication," organ re-
moval" and the type of aversive therapy the JRC used to treat Bran-
don."
This Note will examine how a legal doctrine created in 1816 to
resolve obscure property disputes has come to play a central role in
some of today's most charged medical disputes.' 6 In Part I, this Note
traces the history of the substituted judgment doctrine from its crea-
tion in the English Court of Chancery through its first implementa-
tions by American courts." Part II examines the doctrine's absorption
into the law of informed consent," while Part III reviews its application
in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts." Finally, Part IV argues that
a 1997 Supreme Judicial Court decision addressing the treatment of
Brandon has upset the equilibrium that had been struck in Mas-
sachsuetts between the substituted judgment doctrine's utility and it's
danger for abuse. 2°
I. ROOTS OF THE SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT DOCTRINE
Current applications of the substituted judgment doctrine retain
strong links to the doctrine's original implementation in the English
common law of lunacy. 2 ' English common law recognized two types of
9
 See, e.g., Saikewicz, ro N.E.2d at 419, 431; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146, 148; Whitbread, 35
Eng. Rep. at 879.
1 ° See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419, 431; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146, 148.
"See, e.g., Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 419, 431; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146, 148.
12 See in re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 719-20 (Mass. 1982).
13 See Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 315 (Mass. 1983).
14 See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146, 148.
16 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 118 & n.6.
16 See infra notes 21-170 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 21-63 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 64-101 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 102-76 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 177-280 and accompanying text.
21 See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969).
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mental disability: lunacy and idiocy. 22 Unlike an idiot, who was born
incapacitated with no prospect of recovery, a lunatic could hope to re-
gain his lost mental faculties. 23 This distinction had important ramifica-
tions because the King's control over the property of lunatics and idiots
differed. 24
The Statute De Prerogativa Regis granted the King custody over an
idiot's land, including its profits, until the idiot's death, at which time
the land descended to the idiot's heirs. 25 The Prerogativa Regis, how-
ever, did not give the King custody over a lunatic's land, nor did it
permit the King to take a lunatic's profits for his own use." Instead,
the King was obligated to maintain a lunatic's land and to use any
profits solely for the support of the lunatic and his household. 27 More-
over, if the lunatic recovered his sanity, the land and its profits were
returned. 28 English law thus distinguished between the treatment of
lunatics and idiots on the presumption that a lunatic might regain his
sanity."
In 1816, in Ex Parte Whitbread, the substituted judgment doctrine
became a part of lunacy law." In Whitbread, the Lord Chancellor held
that a court could substitute its judgment for that of a lunatic to
authorize a gift from a lunatic's estate. 31 Whitbread concerned the estate
of a Mr. Hinde. 32 The Lord Chancellor, Lord Eldon, delegated the task
of establishing an annual allowance to support Hinde and his Imme-
diate relations" to a Master." Hinde's niece, however, took umbrage
with the amount she was allocated and petitioned the Chancellor "to
receive such other proportion of the said allowance."34 In other words,
22 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND '0303-05.
25 See id.
24 See Statute De Prerogativa Regis, 1324, 17 Edw. 2, chs. 9 & 10,
25 See id, ch. 9. The authority of this document, which dates from the late thirteenth century,
is debated. See THEODORE F. T. PLucaniz-rr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 542 & n.2
(5th ed. 1956). It is not clear whether such a statute was ever passed, and it was characterized by
Theodore Plucknett as an "unofficial tract." See ict Regardless of its authority, as Professor
Harmon indicates, the Prerogativa Regis "described, if it did not in fact establish, the King's
jurisdiction over the idiot and the lunatic." Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions
and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1990).
2° See Statute De Prerogativa Regis, 1324, 17 Edw. 2, ch. 10.
" Id.
IcL
29 See id. chs. 9 & 10.
3° See Ex Park Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 878-79 (Ch. 1816).
31 See id. at 879.
52 See id. at 878.
33 1d. The Court of Chancery had equitable jurisdiction to discharge the King's duties
regarding lunatics. See Harmon, supra note 25, at 17-19 (citations omitted).
54 Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878.
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she wanted more money—specifically, a portion of the surplus income
generated by the estate."
Lord Eldon was inclined to grant the petition." The Prerogativa
Regis, however, did not give the King—nor his surrogate, Lord Eldon—
the authority to give away the surplus income of a lunatic's estate
before the lunatic's death." On the contrary, Lord Eldon was charged
with the duty of protecting Hinde's property so that it would still be
there if he ever regained his sanity." Lord Eldon was therefore forced
to craft a legal fiction in order to authorize the petition while protect-
ing the integrity of the Chancery."
Lord Eldon created this fiction by noting that the court, when
making allowances, was limited to a consideration of only the lunatic's
situation.° When examining Hinde's situation, Lord Eldon elected to
determine "what it is likely the Lunatic himself would do, if he were
in a capacity to act . . . . "41 In this way, Lord Eldon resolved the primary
problem facing the court—its lack of authority to grant the petition—
by contriving the ability to read Hinde's mind.42 He thus abandoned
judicial objectivity in favor of a legal fiction that relied upon subjective
analysis. 43
38 See id.; Harmon, supra note 25, at 20.
38 See Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879-80; Harmon, supra note 25, at 22.
37 See Statute De Prerogativa Regis, 1324, 17 Edw. 2, ch. 10. (Eng.)
38 See it
39 See Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879; Harmon, supra note 25, at 22. A legal fiction is defined
as an "Ialssumption of fact made by court as basis for deciding a legal question. A situation
contrived by the law to permit a court to dispose of a matter, though it need not be created improperly;
e.g. fiction of lost grant as basis for title by adverse possession." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620
(6th ed. 1991) (emphasis added). Legal scholars have adopted diametrically opposite views of
the legitimacy and usefulness of legal fictions. See Harmon, supra note 25, at 2-16. For example,
Jeremy Bentham argued that "a fiction of law may be defined [as] a wil[l]ful falsehood, having
for its objective the stealing [of] legislative power, by and for hands, which could not, or durst
not, openly claim it,—and, but for the delusion thus produced, could not exercise it." JEREMY
BENTIIAM, Preface Intended for the Second Edition of the FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, in COL-
LECTED WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 509 (l.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart, eds. 1977) (1823). Bentham
thus viewed legal fictions as a tool in the judiciary's usurpation of the legislative process from
Parliament. See it Blackstone, on the other hand, took a benevolent view of legal fictions in line
with his championship of the common law system. See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *43. He wrote that legal fictions were "highly beneficial and u[s]eful"
when used to "prevent a mi[s]chief, or remedy an inconvenience, that might re[s]ult from the
general rule of law." Id. From the earliest stages, therefore, the debate on legal fictions has been
divided between those enamored with their utility and those worried about their abuse. Compare
id., with BENTHAM, supra, at 509.
40 See Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
41 Id.
42 See it By contriving a situation at law to dispose of a matter, Lord Eldon created a legal
fiction, See id.; see generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (6th ed. 1991).
43 See Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
July 1999]	 SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT DOCTRINE	 973
Moreover, in determining what it is likely Hinde would have done,
Lord Eldon did not consider evidence of Hinde's mental state during
his earlier periods of lucidity." Hinde, as a lunatic, had enjoyed periods
of competency and Lord Eldon could have based his decision on
preferences Hinde had demonstrated before losing his faculties." In-
stead, Lord Eldon reasoned that no lunatic would want his family to
be "sent into the world to disgrace him as beggars." 46 Therefore, the
court in Whitbread grounded its decision on the preferences of a
hypothetical reasonable lunatic rather than on the expressed prefer-
ences of Hinde himself. 47
After Whitbread, however, the Chancery focused on the fact that
lunatics, unlike idiots, by definition had been lucid at one point."
From these periods of lucidity, Chancellors extrapolated how a lunatic
might act if he regained competence." Chancellors could thus use
evidence of a lunatic's former donative intent to justify giving away a
lunatic's property. 5°
For instance, in 1870, in In re Frost, the Chancery Appeals Court
based a substituted judgment decision on evidence of a lunatic's for-
mer intentions." As in Whitbread, Frost concerned a petition by a
lunatic's poorer relatives for money from the lunatic's estate." In this
case, however, the lunatic had expressed a desire to provide for the
petitioners before becoming incompetent." The court reasoned that
these assertions provided concrete evidence that the lunatic would
have granted the petition herself were she competent to do so."
44 see id,
45 See id.; BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *304-05.
46 Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
47 See id.; Harmon, supra note 25, at 23.
48 See, e.g., In re Darling, 39 Ch. D. 208, 208, 212-13 (Ch. 1888) (denying petition for support
because of evidence of former donative intent); In re Frost, 5 L.R.-Ch. 699, 701, 702 (Ch. App.
1870) (granting petition for support because of evidence of former donative intent).
" See, e,g., Darling, 39 Ch. D. at 208, 212-13; Frost, 5 L.R.-Ch. at 701, 702.
50 See Frost, 5 L.R.-C.h. at 701, 702.
st see id.
52 See id. at 700; Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 878. The lunatic in Frost was a fifty-nine-year-old
woman with real estate worth £70,000 and an annual income of £4,500. See 5 L.R.-Ch. at 700. Her
relatives, on the other hand, all earned less than £104 a year. See id.
55 See Frost, 5 L.R.-Ch. at 701.
m See id. at 702. Similarly, in 1888, in Darling, the court relied on evidence of a lunatic's
former gift giving. See 39 Ch. D. at 208, 212-13. In Darling, a wealthy eighty-two-year-old bachelor
had lost his mental faculties. See id. at 208-09. Before going insane, the lunatic had granted small
allowances to three of his cousins. See id. at 208. After he went insane, these three cousins sought
an increase in their allowance, and three other cousins sought financial support from Darling's
estate as well. See id. at 209. The Chancery denied the request, however, reasoning that the
lunatic's former gifts were evidence of the scope of his donative intent toward the petitioners.
See id. at 212-13.
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In 1884, in In re Willoughby, the New York Court of Chancery
embraced this approach in the first American case to apply Lord
Eldon's legal fiction. 55 In Willoughby, the court held that a lunatic
would not have granted an allowance out of his estate were he of sound
mind.56 Willoughby addressed the petition of a lunatic's wife for an
allowance out of the lunatic's estate for her daughter by a former
husband. 57 At trial, a nephew opposing the petition offered evidence
that Mr. Willoughby, before being declared a lunatic, did not consider
the daughter an adopted child or entitled to his support.°
The court held that it had the authority to grant the petition
under the doctrine of substituted judgment, citing Whitbread and its
English common law progeny as authority. 59 The Chancellor, however,
in light of the nephew's evidence, was not convinced that Mr. Wil-
loughby would have made the gift if competent.° The court in Wil-
loughby focused on the preferences a particular lunatic expressed when
lucid, rather than on conjecture of how a reasonable lunatic would act
when competent. 61 The first American court to apply the substituted
judgment doctrine thus based its decision upon concrete evidence of
a lunatic's intent.° In doing so, the court rejected Lord Eldon's hypo-
thetical reasonable lunatic, embracing instead the evidentiary 'require-
ments of the English Court of Chancery post-Whitbread.°
II. EMERGENCE IN INFORMED CONSENT
After Willoughby, the substituted judgment doctrine remained qui-
etly ensconced in the law of property until 1966. 64 Then, in Strunk u
Strunk, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky pushed the doctrine into the
55 See 11 Paige Ch. 257, 260-61 (N.Y. Ch. 1844); Harmon, supra note 25, at 27.
56
 See 11 Paige Ch. at 260-61.
51 Set id. at 258.
38 See id. at 258, 260-61.
59 See id. at 259-60.
6° See id. at 260-61.
61 See Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. at 260-61.
es see id.
63 See id.; Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879; see also Frost, 5 L.R.-Ch. at 702 (predicating
substituted judgment doctrine upon concrete evidence). Similarly, three years later, the same New
York Chancellor relied on evidence of a lunatic's former generosity when authorizing gifts from
his estate in In re Heeney. See l Barb. Ch. 326, 328-29 (N.Y. Ch. 1847). Heeney concerned Cornelius
Heeney, an elderly bachelor with a significant estate. See id. at 327. The Chancellor noted that
I-lee:ley, when competent, supported a number of people and was in the habit of spending the
whole residue of his income in acts of benevolence, and charity, and piety." Id. This evidence
justified the Chancellor's authorization of the continuance of support. See id. at 329.
64 See, e.g., In re Flagler, 162 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1928) (granting petition for support of
incompetent person's second cousin because of evidence of prior gifts); In re Fleming, 19 N.Y.S.2d
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spotlight by using it to authorize an incompetent person's organ do-
nation.° In Strunk, a mother petitioned for permission to remove a
kidney from her son Jerry, who was twenty-seven years old and mentally
incompetent.66 The mother made this request because Jerry's older
brother Tommy suffered from a fatal kidney disease and needed a
transplant in order to survive. 67
A lower court concluded that the operation was in Jerry's best
interest because the loss of a kidney would be less psychologically
severe than the loss of his brother.° The lower court, however, ques-
tioned its authority to act on this determination and sought approval
from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.° The Court of Appeals rea-
soned that the substituted judgment doctrine constituted a right to act
on behalf of an incompetent person, citing Whitbread and Willoughby
as authority. 70 The Court of Appeals further held that the "doctrine of
substituted judgment ... is broad enough not only to cover property
but also to cover all matters touching on the well-being of the ward."71
The court thus significantly expanded the role of the substituted judg-
ment doctrine, wresting Lord Eldon's legal fiction from the realm of
property and into its modern role as a justification for the medical
treatment of incompetent persons. 72
In addition, the doctrine as applied by the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky was stripped of evidentiary requirements. 7s Jerry Strunk had
been incompetent since birth and could not hope to become compe-
tent in the future. 74 From a common law perspective, he was considered
an idiot rather than a lunatic. 75 The Kentucky Court of Appeals there-
fore had no period of competency upon which to base its substituted
judgment decision, it consequently could not satisfy the evidentiary
requirements that had been placed upon the doctrine post- Whitbread. 76
234, 236, 237 (App. Div. 1950) (granting petition for allowance to niece based on finding of
incompetent person's support of niece when competent).
65 See 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969).
66 See id. at 146.
67 See id. Jerry was the only donor in the family who was medically acceptable. See id.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 145.
"See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 147.
71 M.
72 See id. at 148.
75 See id. at 146-47; see also Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. at 260-61 (predicating substituted
judgment doctrine upon concrete evidence); Frost, 5 1.-11..-Ch. at 702 (same).
74
 See Strunk, 445 S.W,2c1 at 146.
75 See id. at 146; BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *303-05.
76 See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146-49; see also In re Darling, 39 Ch. D. 208, 212-13 (Ch. 1888)
(basing decision on evidence of donative intent from period of lucidity); In re Willoughby, 11
Paige Ch. 257, 260-61 (N.Y. Ch, 1844) (same).
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Instead, the court concluded that a reasonable person in Jerry Strunk's
situation would elect to donate his kidney, thereby embracing the legal
fiction as it was originally formulated by Lord Eldon. 77
Courts considering substituted judgment treatment decisions after
Strunk, however, adopted the evidentiary prerequisites of the post-
Whitbread decisions." For instance, in 1981, in In re Storar, the Court
of Appeals of New York imposed strict evidentiary requirements on
substituted judgment decisions." In Storar, the court decided two cases,
one concerning John Storar and the other addressing Brother Fox.°
John Storar, a fifty-two-year-old man with a mental age of approximately
eighteen months, had terminal bladder cancer." He required daily
blood transfusions, which upset him, and was given only three to six
months to live. 82 His mother sought a court order to terminate the
transfusions.°
Brother Fox, on the other hand, was an eighty-three-year-old mem-
ber of the Order of the Society of Mary." During surgery to repair a
hernia, Brother Fox suffered irreversible brain damage due to a car-
diac arrest and was put on a respirator that maintained him in a
vegetative state. 85 Before the operation, Brother Fox had been a regular
participant in public discussions concerning the termination of life
support.° In these discussions, he had stated that he would not want
extraordinary means of treatment used to keep him alive. 87 A friend of
Brother Fox consequently petitioned the court to be appointed his
guardian with the authority to remove the respirator. 88
The Court of Appeals of New York granted the petition concern-
ing Brother Fox but denied the one concerning John Storar.° The
court reasoned that in Brother Fox's case, there was compelling proof
that he would have elected to remove the respirator were he competent
17 See Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146-49; Ex Park Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878,879 (Ch. 1816).
78 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408,425-26 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Storar v. Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64,72-73 (N.Y.
1981).
79 See 420 N.E.2d at 72-73. These requirements consist of evidence of a person's preferences
when competent. See id.
so See id. at 66.
81
 See id. at 68-69.
82 See id. at 69.
88 See id.
84 See Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 66.
See id. at 67.
"Se e id. at 68.
87 See id.
89 See id. at 67.
99 See Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73.
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to do so." Storar, however, had never been competent at any point in
his life. 9' In that case, the court refused to infer how Storar would have
elected to be treated if competent. 92 The court therefore recognized
the common law distinction between lunatics and idiots and balked at
applying the substituted judgment doctrine to individuals in the latter
category." Moreover, the court rejected Lord Eldon's reasonable luna-
tic approach, relying instead on Brother Fox's assertions as evidence
that he would remove the respirator if he were competent to do so. 94
Similarly, in 1988, the Supreme Court of Missouri applied strict
evidentiary requirements to a request to terminate life support in
Cruzan u Director, Missouri Department of Health. 95 Nancy Cruzan, a car
accident victim, was being maintained in a persistent vegetative state
on a gastrostomy feeding and hydration tube 9 6 After the hospital
refused to remove the tube, Cruzan's parents sought judicial authori-
zation for the termination of feeding and hydration.97 A former house-
mate testified that Cruzan had expressed a desire to terminate life
support if she was unable to live a normal life." The Supreme Court
of Missouri found this evidence to be "woefully inadequate" to establish
Cruzan's intent if competent.99 The court held that the choice to
terminate life-sustaining treatment could not be made without clear
proof of a patient's former intent.'" Thus, the court also rejected Lord
Eldon's approach, requiring instead concrete evidence of prior in-
formed consent before life support could be removed. 10 '
DEVELOPMENT OF SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS
In 1977, in Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted an approach to
substituted judgment decisions that was free of the evidentiary require-
90 See id. at 72.
0 ' See id.
" See id. at 72-73.
93 See id.; BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at *303-05.
94 See Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 72; Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. at 879.
95 See 760 S.W.2d at 425-26.
96 See id. at 410-11.
97 See id. at 410.
98 See id. at 424.
99 Id.
10° See Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424, 426. The court did not indicate what would constitute
informed consent, noting only that informally expressed reactions to the medical treatment of
others is not clear proof of intent. See id. at 424 (citation omitted).
1 ° 1 See id. at 424, 426; Ex Parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816).
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ments embraced by New York and Missouri.w2 Saikewicz involved the
treatment of Joseph Saikewicz, a profoundly mentally retarded sixty-
seven-year-old man residing at the Belchertown State School. 1 °3 In
1976, Saikewicz was diagnosed with acute myeblastic monocytic leuke-
mia, a blood disease that is invariably fatal, and the school petitioned
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem with the authority to make
decisions regarding Saikewicz's care. 1 °4
The Probate Court for Hampshire County appointed a guardian
ad litem, who in turn filed a report indicating that chemotherapy was
the medically recommended course of treatment for Saikewicz's ill-
ness. 105 The guardian ad litem noted, however, that Saikewicz would
not understand the adverse side effects and discomfort caused by
chemotherapy treatments. 146 The guardian ad litem therefore recom-
mended that chemotherapy be withheld because the fear and pain that
it would cause Saikewicz outweighed the uncertain and limited pros-
pect of extending his life.w The probate court issued an order in
agreement with the guardian's recommendation.'°8
The Supreme Judicial Court upheld the order on appeal, holding
that the substituted judgment doctrine was the proper legal standard
to govern treatment decisions.mIn reaching this conclusion, the court
noted that the constitutional right to individual privacy encompasses
a patient's right to preserve her privacy against unwanted infringe-
ments of bodily integrity.' The court reasoned that this right to choose
whether or not to succumb to medical treatment extends to both
incompetent and competent persons because the value of human
dignity extends to both."
When substituting judgment, the Supreme Judicial Court indi-
cated that a judge should seek to ascertain an incompetent person's
actual interests and preferences and should try to reach the decision
that would be reached by that person if he or she were competent." 2
'" See 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass. 1977); see also Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425-26
(Mo. 1988) affd sub nom. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Storar v. Storar,
420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981).
1 °3 See Sailiewin, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
104 See id. at 419-20.
105 See id. at 419.
1 °8
 See id.
lo7 see id.
I" See Saikewitz., 370 N.E.2d at 419.
I® See id. at 419-20, 431.
"° See id. at 424.
111 See id. at 427.
1" See id. at 431.
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Since Saikewicz had never been competent, however, the court was
unable to rely on evidence of his preferences during a period of
lucidity."3 As in Strunk, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
therefore based its decision on how a reasonable person in Saikewicz's
position would act instead of on concrete evidence of Saikewicz's
preferences when competent." 4
After Saikewicz, however, the court limited the trier of fact's dis-
cretion to determine how a reasonable person might act by imposing
procedural requirements on the substituted judgment process.'" For
instance, in 1980, in In re Spring, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that a judge cannot delegate ultimate decision-making
authority. 116 In Spring, a probate judge found that a patient suffering
from an end-stage kidney disease would refuse additional life-prolong-
ing hemodialysis treatment if he were competent.'" The judge then
delegated the decision of whether to continue or terminate the dialysis
treatment to the patient's attending physician, wife and son.'" The
Supreme Judicial Court reversed, however, reasoning that when prop-
erly presented with a legal question, the judge cannot delegate it. 19
The court thus held that substituted judgment decisions can only be
made by a judge.' 2°
In 1981, in In re Guardianship of Roe, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court imposed additional procedural requirements on the
substituted judgment process.' 21 In Roe, a father sought the authority
to forcibly administer antipsychotic medication to his son.' 22 The re-
quest was rejected, as in Spring, on the grounds that the judiciary could
not delegate substituted judgment decisions. 123 The Supreme Judicial
Court then identified six factors that a judge must consider to make a
proper substituted judgment analysis. 124 These factors included an in-
competent person's expressed preferences, religious beliefs, the im-
pact of a proposed treatment on the family, the probability of adverse
115 See Saikewin, 370 N.E.2d at 420, 431-32.
114 See id. at 431-32; Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146-48.
115 See infra notes 116-58 and accompanying text.
n6 See 415 N.E.2d 115, 120, 122 (Mass. 1980).
"7 See id. at 117, 118.
118 See id. at 117.
119 See id at 120, 122.
I" See id.
121 See 421 N.E.2d 40, 50 (Mass. 1981).
122 See id. at 43-44.
in See id. at 51; Spring, 415 N.E.2d at 120, 122.
124 see Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 56-57.
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side effects, the consequences of refusing treatment and the prognosis
with treatment. 125
In Roe, the Supreme Judicial Court further contributed to the
procedural requirements of the substituted judgment doctrine by hold-
ing that a judge must indicate in written findings the reasons for and
against treatment for each factor.'" Because of the seriousness of sub-
stituted judgment decisions, the court reasoned implicitly that docu-
mentation requirements should be more stringent than in ordinary
findings of fact. 127
Finally, in Roe, the Supreme Judicial Court added a new plank to
the substituted judgment doctrine by introducing the concept of treat-
ment plans. 125 The court noted that in the administration of a decision
authorizing forcible medication, a "judge may appropriately authorize
a treatment program which utilizes various specifically identified medi-
cations administered over a prolonged period of time."'" Long-term
treatment was thus sanctioned, obviating the need to secure judicial
approval for every individual act necessary to implement a treatment
decision.'" The court reasoned implicitly that treatment plans would
diminish the burdens placed on the medical community by the substi-
tuted judgment process."'
In 1983, in Rogers v. Commissioner of Department of Mental Health,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts again added to the pro-
cedural requirements for substituted judgment decisions.'" Rogers was
a class action suit on behalf of all patients at the May and Austin Units
of the Boston State Hospital who had been medicated without their
125 See id. at 57.
1" See id. at 59; see also Guardianship of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1271 (Mass. 1992) (holding
that "seriousness of the decision will be more forcefully impressed on judges if they are required
to set forth their findings in 'meticulous detail'") (citation omitted); In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071,
1076 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (same). In R.H., the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that a judge's
findings be set forth in meticulous detail and reflect "a careful balancing and weighing of the
various interests and factors involved, including within each factor those reasons both for and
against treatment, as well as a logical nexus between the conclusion reached and the facts found."
622 N.E.2d at 1076. The court found that the probate judge did not consider the issue of the
ward's expressed preferences regarding treatment, did not weigh the benefits of the proposed
treatment against any disadvantages and did not relate the ultimate treatment decision to any
medical evidence. See id. at 1077, 1079. The court concluded that against this background, the
substituted judgment decision was conclusory and that it could not be accepted. See id. at 1079.
127 See Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 59; see also Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1271; RH., 622 N.E.2d at 1076.
128 See 421 N.E.2d at 59 n.19.
129 Id.
1" See id.
131 See id.
132 See 458 N.E.2d 308, 314, 318 (Mass. 1983).
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consent.'" The hospital argued that the plaintiffs could not refuse
forced treatment with antipsychotic drugs because each had been
committed to the hospital after a judicial finding of mental illness.'"
The court held, however, that the hospital had to submit a distinct
finding of incompetence before it could override a patient's right to
make treatment decisions.'"
After making this initial holding, the Supreme Judicial Court
outlined the scope of the judicial procedure to be followed in making
substituted judgment decisions.'" The court held that a judge may
conduct a hearing on the appropriate treatment after a person is
adjudicated incotnpetent."7 At the hearing, the parties must be given
an adequate opportunity to be heard.'" To this end, the court reasoned
that it should appoint a guardian ad litem and gather the opinions of
experts so that all views would be available to the judge."' Finally, the
court held that a judge should approve a treatment plan after making
the original substituted judgment decision."° Treatment plans were
introduced in Roe, where the Supreme Judicial Court indicated that
every treatment plan should provide for periodic review to determine
if a ward's condition and circumstances have substantially changed."'
In Rogers, the Supreme Judicial Court added further checks to the
process, implicitly recognizing the danger of abuse posed by treatment
plans."' The court thus held that treatment plans must be monitored
by a guardian or by the judge if no guardian is readily available."'
The concept of periodic review, however, was not thoroughly de-
veloped until the Supreme Judicial Court readdressed the issue in
1991, in Guardianship of Weedon. 144 In Medan, the court held that
1 " See id. at 311.
1" See id. at 315.
1 " See id. at 314.
"6 See id. at 318.
137 See Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 318.
1" See id.; see also In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 721 (Mass. 1982) (holding that "Mu all cases,
the parties must be given adequate notice of the proceedings, an opportunity to be heard in the
trial court, and to pursue an appeal.").
139 See Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 318. in Moe, the guardian ad litetn was charged with the
responsibility of representing the ward and presenting all reasonable arguments in favor of
denying the petition. See 432 N.E.2d at 721. The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that this
adversary posture ensures that both sides of each issue will be thoroughly aired before a decision
is rendered. See id.
140 See Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 318.
141 See Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 59 n.19.
142 see Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 318 & n.20.
143
 See id.
141 See 565 N.E.2d 432, 435 (Mass. 1991).
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substituted judgment treatment orders cannot remain effective in-
definitely. 145 Weedon addressed an attempt by physicians to invoke a
treatment plan, authorized five years earlier, to forcibly administer
antipsychotic drugs to a patient. 146 The Supreme Judicial Court rea-
soned that a treatment plan's validity is based on a patient's current
circumstances and that the factors weighed when authorizing a treat-
ment plan could change significantly with the passage of time. 147 The
court thus held that treatment plans must provide for periodic review
to ensure that a patient is not treated against her will according to a
plan that no longer accurately reflects her preferences.m
Finally, in 1997, in Guardianship of Brandon, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court added the last procedural requirement to the
substituted judgment process. 149 In Brandon, the court held that a
"substantial change in circumstances" standard should apply to peri-
odic reviews of treatment plans.' 5° Until this decision, the Supreme
Judicial Court had provided little guidance on the issue of how a court
should handle the review process.'"
In 1994, the JRC was treating Brandon subject to a treatment plan
authorized in 1992.' 52 A probate judge conducted a treatment plan
review and determined that there had been no substantial change in
Brandon's condition and circumstances. 155 The judge thus entered an
order authorizing a treatment plan proposed by the JRC that permitted
the continued use of aversive therapies, such as the GED.'" On appeal,
145 See id.
146 See id. at 434.
147 See id. at 435; see also Guardianship of Linda, 519 N.E.2d 1296, 1297-98 (Mass. 1988)
(denying request for prospective order allowing treatment with antipsychotic drugs if contingency
arose because substituted judgment decisions must be based upon current rather than future
circumstances).
1" See Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 455. Moreover, the Supreme judicial Court noted that periodic
review alone may not adequately suffice in all cases to protect patients' rights. See id. As a result,
the court concluded that with extraordinary medical procedures such as the forcible administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs, a termination date must also be included in a substituted judgment
plan. See id.
'45 See 677 N.E.2d 114, 120 (Mass. 1997).
150
 Id.
151 See JOHN H. CROSS ET AL., GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP IN MASSACHUSETTS
6-23.1 (1997). Some courts had adopted a de novo review of the order, retrying the case and
placing the burden to go forward and the burden of proof on the party seeking to extend the
order. See id. In other courts, the practice was to handle reviews without trials or hearings. See id.
Instead, the parties would stipulate to the entry of an order extending or amending a treatment
authorization. See id.
152 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 118.
153 See id. at 118, 119.
154 See id.
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counsel for Brandon argued that the "substantial change in circum-
stances" standard was not appropriate in substituted judgment pro-
ceedings and that a de novo review of treatment plans was warranted
instead.' 5'
The Supreme Judicial Court disagreed and held that periodic re-
views of substituted judgment orders should be used to determine if a
patient's condition and circumstances have substantially changed since
the time a substituted judgment order was first entered. 156 The court
reasoned that "a patient's current circumstances can be adequately
evaluated through an examination of any substantial changes that have
occurred since the original substituted judgment hearing." 157 As a re-
sult, the court concluded that there was no reason to adopt a de novo
standard of review.' 58
The treatment plan review process post-Brandon is exemplified by
two recent JRC cases. 159 In 1997, in In re Andrew, a master of the
Probate Court of Bristol County held that the JRC's proposed treat-
ment plan was the best means of treating an incompetent student.'°°
Andrew, a twenty-five-year-old man, had been admitted to the JRC in
May 1984. 161 The JRC had proposed a plan that was essentially identical
to the plan under which it previously had been authorized to treat
Andrew.I 62
The master found that Andrew's behavior and lifestyle had im-
proved dramatically during his thirteen-year tenure at the JRC.' 6' The
master determined that Andrew was safe and happy and that his inter-
action with his parents was significantly improved.'" This condition
stood in contrast to Andrew's behavior before admission to the JRC,
which was characterized in his treatment plan as highly disruptive,
destructive and non-compliant.' 65 Although noting the improvements
155 See id. at 120.
"See id. (emphasis added).
157 Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 120.
158 See id.
mg See Master's Findings of Fact on Treatment Plan Review at 1-6, In re F,11y, No. 70P0353-MR
(Bristol County Prob. Ct. Sept. 23, 1998) (unpublished findings of fact, on file with the author)
[hereinafter Elly Findings of Fact]; Master's Findings of Fact on Treatment Plan Review at 1-3,
In reAndrew, No. 87P1411-G1 (Bristol County Prob. Ct. Sept. 17, 1997) (unpublished findings of
fact, on file with author) [hereinafter Andrew Findings of Fact].
16° See Andrew Findings of Fact, supra note 159, at 3.
161 See id. at 1.
152 See id. at 2-3. The JRC neither added treatments nor proposed the elimination of any
treatments that were being utilized to u .eat Brandon. See id.
165 See id. at 2.
164 See id.
166 See Proposed Behavior Modification Treatment Plan at 1, In re Andrew, No. 87P1411-G1
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in Andrew's condition, the court did not consider whether Andrew's
substantially changed condition might impact his decision to submit
to continued aversive therapy.' 66
Likewise, in 1998, in In re Elly, a master of the Bristol County
Probate Court found that Elly's condition had changed significantly
during his seven-and-a-half years of treatment at the JRC.' 67 Upon
admission to the JRC, Elly was confined by helmet, leg and waist
restraints, but at the time of the treatment plan review, he no longer
required mechanical restraints.' 68 Moreover, the court found that Elly,
who had received regular shock applications via the GED during the
beginning of his treatment, was being faded off the GED. 169 In approv-
ing the JRC's proposed treatment plan, however, the master did not
consider how these changes in Elly's circumstances might impact his
decision to submit to continued aversive therapy. 170
As the decisions from Saikewicz through Brandon demonstrate,
substituted judgment treatment decisions in Massachusetts are gov-
erned by process rather than evidence. 171 According to this proce-
dure, only a judge can make a substituted judgment decision, 17" and a
hearing may be conducted to facilitate the decision-making process.' 73
Judges must consider the six factors identified in Roe174 and justify their
decisions in detailed findings of fact. 175 Finally, if a treatment plan is
implemented, the plan must be reviewed periodically to ensure that a
patient's circumstances have not changed substantially.' 76
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS COMPROMISE
In adopting the approach presented above, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has struck a balance between the substituted
judgment doctrine's dangers and benefits.'" The court has protected
against the profound potential for the doctrine's abuse by instituting
(Bristol County Prob. Ct. Sept. 17, 1997) (unpublished treatment plan, on file with the author)
[hereinafter Andrew Treatment Plan].
166 SeeAndrew Findings of Fact, supra note 159, at 1-3.
167 See Filly Findings of Fact, supra note 159, at 3-4.
168 See id. at 3.
169 See id.
11° See id. at 1-6.
171 See supra notes 115-70 and accompanying text.
172 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
17$ See supra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
174 See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
175 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
176 See supra notes 141-58 and accompanying text.
177 See infra notes 181-223 and accompanying text.
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procedural safeguards.'" At the same time, the court has freed the
doctrine from the strict evidentiary requirements that limit its utility
in other states.'" Moreover, in striking this balance, the Supreme Judi-
cial Court has rectified the problems created by the carelessness of its
legal borrowing in Saikeruicz.' 8°
In Saikewicz, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ignored
the common law history of the doctrine it borrowed. 181 After Whitbread,
Chancery courts in both England and America were uncomfortable
with Lord Eldon's reasonable lunatic approach to substituted judg-
ment decisions.' 82 Indeed, they balked at navigating an incompetent
person's mind without the benefit of evidentiary signposts to guide
them in the right direction."'
As a result, post-Whitbread courts emphasized the distinction be-
tween "idiots" and "lunatics" when substituting judgment. 184 At com-
mon law, an idiot was not of sound mind and never could be. 186 A
lunatic, on the other hand, at one time possessed a sound mind but
lost it.' 86 By focusing on a lunatic's period of lucidity, post-Whitbread
courts based substituted judgment decisions on evidence of a person's
mental state when competent.' 87 Hence, there was no need to speculate
about a reasonable lunatic's preferences, and Lord Eldon's legal fiction
became tolerable to jurists reluctant to give away property without
ample justification.'"
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, had no evi-
dentiary signposts to consider in its seminal substituted judgment de-
cision. 189 Joseph Saikewicz had never been competent and there was
consequently no period of lucidity on which to base a treatment deci-
sion.'" Instead, the court was forced to hypothesize how a reasonable
178 See infra notes 194-217 and accompanying text.
179 See infra notes 218-23 and accompanying text.
' 80 See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 431 (Mass.
1977); Harmon, supra note 25, at 63-64.
181 Compare Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 432 (applying substituted judgment doctrine without
evidentiary requirements), with In re Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. 257, 260-61 (N.Y. Ch. 1844)
(basing substituted judgment decision on evidence of former donative intent).
182 See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
183 See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
184 See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text; see generally BLACKSTONE, supra note 22, at
*303-05.
l 55 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
188 See supra notes 48-63 and accompanying text; see also Harmon, supra note 25, at 24, 58,
60.
189 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32.
190 See id. at 420, 432.
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person in Saikewicz's situation would act, thereby embracing the ap-
proach rejected by both American and English courts post-Whitbread."'
The Massachusetts substituted judgment doctrine is thus a com-
pounded legal fiction.' 92 Not only must Massachusetts judges make the
impossible trip into the mind of an incompetent person, but they also
must invent what they find once they get there.'"
The discomfort of post- Whitbread jurists with the substituted judg-
ment doctrine, however, has not been completely ignored by the Mas-
sachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.'" Indeed, the court has been quite
reluctant to give the presiding judge unfettered power to render sub-
stituted judgment treatment decisions. 195 Instead of requiring con-
crete evidence of a person's preferences when competent, the court
has grounded substituted judgment decisions with procedural require-
ments.'" In some ways, these procedural hurdles are more onerous
than the evidentiary limitations adopted by other states.' 97
For example, a substituted judgment decision in Massachusetts
cannot be delegated to an incompetent person's guardian or doctor.'"
Unlike New York, which granted a guardian the authority to remove
Brother Fox's respirator, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has
reasoned that the issues raised in substituted judgment decisions "re-
quire the process of detached but passionate investigation and decision
that forms the ideal on which the judicial branch was created."'" In
addition, the fact that substituted judgment decisions can only be made
by the judiciary ensures that the Supreme Judicial Court's procedural
safeguards will have an impact.'"
One such safeguard is the stringent documentation requirement
introduced by the court in Roe."' By demanding meticulous detail,
"careful balancing" and "a logical nexus between the conclusion
reached and the facts found [,]" the Supreme Judicial Court has at-
191 See id. at 431-32; In re Darling, 39 Ch. D. 208, 208, 212-13 (Ch. 1888); Willoughby,
 11
Paige Ch. at 260-61.
m See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32; Harmon, supra note 25, at 59.
193 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32; Harmon, supra note 25, at 59.
194 See supra notes 115-58 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 115-58 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 115-58 and accompanying text.
197 Compare Storar v. Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981), with In re Spring, 415 N.E.2d
115, 120 (Mass. 1980).
I" See, e.g., Spring, 415 N.E.2d at 120; Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40, 51 (Mass. 1981).
199 Compare Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 51, with Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 72.
2130
 See, e.g., Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 51; Spring, 415 N.E.2d at 120.
"1 See Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 59; see also In re R.H., 622 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (Mass. 1993)
(remanding case due to insufficient documentation).
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tempted to ensure that judges will not render substituted judgments
that are unsubstantiated. 202 Moreover, by requiring judges to commit
their reasoning to paper in such detail, the Supreme Judicial Court
has facilitated appellate review of the process, thereby ensuring consis-
tency in the application of the doctrine."
In addition, the court has tried to ensure that substituted judg-
ment decisions will be properly informed by requiring a hearing on
the appropriate treatment to be administered in cases where a person's
competence has been contested."' In order to allow the parties a full
opportunity to be heard, the court strongly recommends the appoint-
ment of a guardian ad litem and the solicitation of expert testimony. 206
The court therefore recommends an adversarial proceeding to guar-
antee that "all viewpoints and alternatives will be aggressively pur-
sued. "2°6
Most important, however, is the Supreme Judicial Court's require-
ment that judges base substituted judgment decisions upon a consid-
eration of an incompetent person's current circurnstances. 207 The
greatest danger of Lord Eldon's legal fiction is that a judge will impose,
rather than substitute, judgment." Indeed, evidentiary requirements
were placed on the doctrine post-Whitbread out of concern for judicial
abuse." In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court's emphasis on
an incompetent person's current circumstances serves as a similar,
though less blunt, check on the natural tendency to filter decisions
through one's personal value system. 21°
There is no way of guaranteeing that the biases of the presiding
judge will not find their way into substituted judgment decisions.'" By
requiring a consideration of an incompetent person's current circum-
stances, however, judges are obligated to justify substituted judgment
202 See RH., 622 N.E.2d at 1076.
23 See id.
2°4 See Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308,318 (Mass. 1983);
CROSS ET AL., supra note 151, at 6-22 to —23.
205 See Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 318. Whereas an adversary proceeding is recommended rather
than required, procedures where no testimony is taken are exceptional in the extraordinary
medical treatment context. See CROSS ET AL, supra note 151, at 6-23.
206 Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 433.
207 See, e.g., Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 435; Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 59 11.19.
208 See Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. at 260-61 (requiring strict evidence of intent to offset
concerns regarding substitution of judgment); BErsrrnAm, supra note 39, at 509 (warning about
judicial abuse of legal fictions).
• 409 See, e.g., Darling, 39 Ch. D. at 212-13; Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. at 260-61.
210 See Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 435; Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 59 n.19.
211 see id,
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decisions from an incompetent person's perspective. 212 The process is
guided by the six factors outlined in Roe.2" These non-exhaustive
factors constitute a threshold consideration for every trier of fact. 214
They therefore ensure that each substituted judgment decision is in-
formed by at least a minimal consideration of an incompetent person's
current circumstances. 215 In addition, the court has limited the level of
permissible judicial conjecture by forbidding substituted judgments
based on speculation of what future circumstances might be. 216 The
court's focus on current circumstances therefore grounds the process,
removing it from the completely speculative analysis introduced by
Lord Eldon in Whitbread." 7
Moreover, by rejecting evidentiary limitations, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has maximized the benefits of the substituted
judgment doctrine. 218 States such as New York and Missouri that con-
strain substituted judgment decisions with evidentiary requirements
endorse the common law's discrimination against idiots.'" As a result,
an entire class is denied the benefits of the substituted judgment
process simply because they never enjoyed a period of mental compe-
ten cy.220
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, on the other hand,
has recognized that individuals who fit the common law definition of
idiot enjoy rights comparable to the rest of society. 22' The court rea-
soned in Saikewicz that the right to choose whether or not to succumb
to medical treatment extends to both incompetent and competent
persons because the value of human dignity extends to both. 222 If the
court were to employ the same evidentiary restrictions as New York or
212 see id.
213 see Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 57.
2K See id.
215 see id.
216 weedn, 565 N.E.2d at 435.
217 Compare Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 57 (forcing trier of fact to consider certain criterion), with Ex
Parte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878, 879 (Ch. 1816) (basing decision on conjecture about wishes
of hypothetical reasonable lunatic).
218 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32 (applying substituted judgment doctrine to common
law idiot).
2 ' 9 See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 425-26 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73; Ilt..A.cits-roNE,
supra note 22, at *303-05.
22° Compare Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73 (holding substituted judgment inapplicable in case
concerning never-competent individual), with Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32 (applying substi-
tuted judgment to never-competent individual).
221 See saihewic4 370 N.E.2d at 427.
2n See id.
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Missouri, however, it would be put in the difficult position of extending
the value of human dignity to some incompetent persons while deny-
ing it to others.223
This maximization of utility is not only fairer, it creates a more
palatable legal fiction. 224 One of the main justifications for legal fictions
is their utility. 225 As Blackstone pointed out, legal fictions could be
"highly beneficial" when used to "remedy an inconvenience, that might
result from the general rule of law." 225 Any attempt to "remedy . . . the
general rule of law" invariably leads to the question of who should be
enacting the remedy, the judiciary or the legislature. 227 But, without
descending into a debate on the merits of judicial activism, Black-
stone's justification can be taken at face value: legal fictions are judicial
tools for the resolution of inconsistencies in the law. 225
Legal fictions are therefore justified not by their proximity to
reality, but by the scope of their utility. 229 In this light, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has adopted a superior version of the substi-
tuted judgment doctrine by stressing utility over evidentiary restric-
tions.230 Moreover, the court has addressed concerns about judicial
abuse of legal fictions by imposing procedural safeguards. 231 The bal-
ance struck between the doctrine's utility and its potential for abuse,
however, is precarious and can be upset easily if the Supreme Judicial
Court does not carefully guard against favoring one side over the
other. 232
In Brandon, the scales have been tipped too far. 2" The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held in Brandon that substituted judg-
ment treatment plans should be reviewed under a "substantial change
in circumstances" standard. 294 The Brandon decision, however, fails to
offer sufficient guidance as to how to determine whether an incompe-
tent person's circumstances have substantially changed, thereby upset-
ting the balance against procedural protections. 233
2s
	 Cruz= 760 S.W.2d at 425-26; Starer, 420 N.E.2d at 72-73; Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at
427, 431.
224 See BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at 43.
2" See id.
226 1d.
227 Id.; see BENTHAM, supra note 39, at 509.
228 See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 431 ; BLACKSTONE, supra note 39, at 43.
222 See id.
230
 See id.
"' See BENTHAM, supra note 39, at 509; supra notes 115-57 and accompanying text.
"2 See Guardianship of Brandon, 677 N.E.2d 119, 120 (Mass. 1997).
253
	 id.
254 Id.
235
 See id. at 120-22.
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The Supreme Judicial Court offered only one clue in Brandon as
to how a trier of fact should determine whether an incompetent per-
son's circumstances had changed substantially.'" The court held that
"in the instant case, in determining whether Brandon's condition had
substantially changed, the judge appropriately weighed the factors
considered at the original substituted judgment hearing . . . ."237 This
indicates that it may be acceptable to determine whether substantial
changes have occurred by reconsidering the factors weighed at the
original substituted judgment hearing.'" The court, however, never
explicitly endorsed this approach.'"
Moreover, the court did not indicate how a reconsideration of the
factors weighed at Brandon's original substituted judgment hearing
had informed the trial court's analysis of Brandon's current circum-
stances.'" For instance, one of the factors that the Supreme Judicial
Court held to be "appropriately weighed" by the trial court was Bran-
don's prognosis with continued treatment."' In analyzing this factor,
the trial court found that Brandon was no longer in any form of
restraint, he had advanced significantly in his communication and
self-care skills and his aggression had decreased dramatically. 242 These
findings suggested that a substantial change in circumstances had
occurred because Brandon's condition was significantly different than
when the original substituted judgment was made.'" The Supreme
Judicial Court, however, did not consider these changes in Brandon's
circumstances. 244
Instead, the court found that Brandon would likely choose to pro-
ceed with treatment because his prognosis was for a continuation of
these improvements.'" This finding is problematic because it ignores
underlying evidence of a significant change in Brandon's circum-
stances.'" The issue is not whether the trial court correctly analyzed
Brandon's likely decision based upon his prognosis with continued
236 See id. at 120.
"'Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 120.
235 See id.
239 See id.
24° See id. at 120-22.
24 ' Id. at 120,121.
242 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 121.
243 See id.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 120-21,
246 See id. at 121.
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treatment, but rather what a reconsideration of this factor illustrates
about Brandon's current situation. 247
As a result of this lack of guidance, the application of the "sub-
stantial change in circumstances" standard has been left to the individ-
ual trier of fact. 248 Moreover, if the judge determines what constitutes
a substantial change in circumstances, there is no protection from
individual bias. 249 Unlike the original substituted judgment decision,
which must be justified against the six Roe factors, 25° each judge can
establish his or her own criterion for what constitutes a substantial
change in circumstances.251 As a result, the treatment plan review
process provides fewer safeguards than those constraining the original
substituted judgment decision. 252 Indeed, it suggests that the review
process is ripe for the type of abuse that worried courts post- Whitbread:
that judges will impose, rather than substitute, judgment. 258
Ironically, the treatment plan review process was instituted to
address the possibility that incompetent persons might be treated in a
manner inconsistent with their current circurnstances. 2" But rather
than a protection, the review process seems to be one layer of proce-
dure too many.255 The post-Brandon implementations of the review
process on the probate level indicate a tendency toward unconsidered,
rubber-stamp approval of severe medical treatments. 256
For instance, Andrew and Elly do not demonstrate a careful weigh-
ing of the current circumstances influencing treatment decisions."' A
master found that both Andrew and Elly had made significant improve-
ments while at the JRC. 258 These improvements would raise a flag to
even a casual observer that the situation surrounding the treatment of
both Andrew and Elly had changed significantly.'" In both cases, how-
ever, the master failed to justify the continuation of treatment from
either Andrew or Elly's current point of view." This failure to consider
247 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 120-21.
245 Set id. at 120; CROSS ET AL., supra note 151, at 6-23.1.
249 See Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 57 (defining minimum scope of substituted judgment analysis as
requiring consideration of six factors).
250
 See id.
"I Set Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 120; CROSS ET AL., supra note 151, at 6-23.1.
232 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at. 120; Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 57.
I" See, e.g., Darling, 59 Ch. D. at 212-13; Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. at 60-61.
454 Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 435.
255 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 120-22; Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 435.
256 See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
257 See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 163-65, 167-69 and accompanying text.
259 See supra notes 163-65, 167-69 and accompanying text.
260 See supra notes 158-70 and accompanying text.
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distinct changes in the circumstances surrounding treatment decisions
is the very eventuality that the Supreme Judicial Court sought to avoid
in Weedon. 261
If the review process is to protect against the implementation of
treatment plans that do not accurately reflect a patient's current situ-
ation, the Supreme Judicial Court will need to clarify Brandon's "sub-
stantial change in circumstances" standard.'" The problem with the
Brandon standard is that it may be impossible to quantify exactly what
is meant by a "substantial change. " 265 At a minimum, however, the court
should stress that a proper analysis requires the trier of fact to make a
comparison. 2" Indeed, common sense dictates that it is impossible to
determine whether circumstances have changed without some juxta-
position of a patient's previous position relative to his or her current
position.265
Moreover, the court should establish a procedural protocol to
guide the decision-making of the lower courts. The purpose of the
review process is to ensure that changes in a patient's circumstances
have not made a treatment plan obsolete. 267 As a result, the issue of
whether or not a patient's circumstances have changed substantially
should be a threshold question of every treatment plan review. 268
Rather than making a patient's current situation an issue in every
review, however, it may be more efficient to delegate the decision via
a rebuttable-presumption, burden-shifting mechanism. 269 A proposed
treatment plan could be presumed to be an accurate reflection of a
patient's current circumstances unless it is challenged by the patient. 27°
If challenged, the patient would bear the burden of proving that his
or her circumstances had significantly changed. 271 If a judge was
satisfied that a patient's situation had changed significantly, the burden
would then shift to the treating party to prove that the proposed plan
was an accurate reflection of a patient's current circumstances. 272
261 See Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 435 (holding that treatment plan review process necessary so
that patient would not be treated against her will according to a plan that no longer accurately
reflected her preferences); supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
262
 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 120; Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 435.
263 See Brandon, 677 N.E.2d at 120.
264 See a
265 see id.
"6 See Roe, 421 N.E.2d at 51, 56-57, 59 & n.19 (adding procedural safeguards).
267 See Weedon, 565 N.E.2d at 435.
268 See id.
269 See Cuoss rr AL., supra note 151, at 6-23.1 to —24.
270 See id.
Vise, a
272 See id.
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Regardless of the procedural system implemented, however, the
trier of fact should be required to record findings concerning a pa-
tient's current situation in meticulous detail.'" The Supreme Judicial
Court has reasoned that, because of the seriousness of substituted judg-
ment decisions, documentation requirements should be more strin-
gent than in ordinary findings of fact.'" Whereas the master may have
determined in Andrew and Elly that the students' improvements did
not rise to the level of a substantial change in circumstances, his
conclusions and reasoning were not recorded in either decision.'" This
result is inexcusable in light of the fact that the analysis of a patient's
current situation is the core issue of the review process. 276 The court
should thus ensure that triers of fact explicitly justify their conclusions
concerning changes in circumstances. 2"
The ultimate goal of a review of Brandon's "substantial change in
circumstances" standard should be to decrease the discretion of the
fact finder.'" The court needs to restrike a balance between the utility
of the substituted judgment doctrine and protection from its abuse. 279
As long as the scale remains tipped against procedural protections, the
Massachusetts substituted judgment doctrine will be no better for 180
years of common law development than it was the day after Lord Eldon
first crafted the legal fiction.' 8°
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Judicial Court needs to restrike a balance between
the substituted judgment doctrine's dangers and benefits. The doc-
trine originated as a legal fiction whereby a court could make gifts of
a lunatic's property before the lunatic's death. To check the potential
for abuse of the doctrine, however, judges based their decisions on
evidence of a lunatic's preferences when lucid. After the doctrine was
borrowed from the law of property and applied to the law of informed
consent, jurisdictions disagreed about whether or not substituted judg-
ment treatment decisions should be predicated upon evidence of an
incompetent person's preferences when competent.
273 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
276 See Weedan, 565 N.E.2d at 435.
2" See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
2" See Willoughby, 11 Paige Ch. at 260-61; BENTHAM, supra note 39, at 509.
279 See supra notes 181-223 and accompanying text.
480 See supra notes 233-61 and accompanying text.
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Massachusetts adopted an approach that is not restricted by strict
evidentiary requirements. The benefit of this approach is that it does
not discriminate against incompetent persons who have never experi-
enced a period of competency. Moreover, the doctrine's potential for
abuse has been checked by procedural safeguards and the requirement
that an incompetent person's current circumstances be considered
when rendering substituted judgment decisions. In addition, a review
process was instituted in recognition of the likelihood of a change in
these circumstances over time. At the review stage, however, the deter-
mination of what constitutes a substantial change in circumstances has
been left solely to the trier of fact. This provides insufficient protection
from the potential for judicial abuse. The Supreme Judicial Court
should consequently readjust the balance by providing guidance as to
what constitutes a substantial change in circumstances.
PETER SKINNER
